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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to provide non-specialist readers with an introduction to some current 
controversies surrounding the application of evolutionary theory to human behaviour at the 
intersection of biology, psychology and anthropology. We review the three major contemporary 
sub-fields; namely Human Behavioural Ecology, Evolutionary Psychology and Cultural 
Evolution, and we compare their views on maladaptive behaviour, the proximal mechanisms of 
cultural transmission, and the relationship between human cognition and culture. For example, 
we show that the sub-fields vary in the amount of maladaptive behaviour that is predicted to 
occur in modern environments; Human Behavioural Ecologists start with the expectation that 
behaviour will be optimal, while Evolutionary Psychologists emphasize cases of ‘mis-match’ 
between modern environments and domain-specific, evolved psychological mechanisms. 
Cultural Evolutionists argue that social learning processes are effective at providing solutions to 
novel problems and describe how relatively weak, general-purpose learning mechanisms, 
alongside accurate cultural transmission, can lead to the cumulative evolution of adaptive 
cultural complexity but also sometimes to maladaptative behaviour. We then describe how the 
sub-fields view cooperative behaviour between non-kin, as an example of where the differences 
between the sub-fields are relevant to the economics community, and we discuss the hypothesis 
that a history of inter-group competition can explain the evolution of non-kin cooperation. We 
conclude that a complete understanding of human behaviour requires insights from all three 
fields and that many scholars no longer view them as distinct. 
 
Keywords: human behavioural ecology, evolutionary psychology, cooperation, gene-culture co-
evolution, cultural group selection  
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1 Applying evolutionary theory to human behaviour 
The application of evolutionary theory to the study of human behaviour has a long and 
contentious history (Boakes 1984; Laland and Brown 2011). Over this history, the fields of 
economics and the biological sciences have drawn inspiration from each other, but the social and 
biological sciences have also been in apparent conflict (Hodgson and Knudsen 2008; Witt 1999). 
In order for communication between different academic fields to be successful, individual 
researchers need to meet the challenge of incorporating the most recent advances from multiple 
disciplines. This challenge is certainly not straightforward, but is aided by inter-disciplinary 
journals, such as the Journal of Bioeconomics. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this inter-
disciplinary discussion by presenting a brief summary of some of the current debates at the 
interface of biology, anthropology, and psychology, thereby provide readers with information 
about the issues that are being discussed at this relevant junction. 
 Our approach is, in itself, somewhat controversial: we present a number of sub-fields 
within the evolutionary human behavioural sciences (namely Human Behavioural Ecology, 
Evolutionary Psychology and Cultural Evolution) and draw distinctions between some of the 
underlying assumptions of the research conducted under each of these headings. Other 
researchers have argued instead that the sub-fields are highly complementary and exhibit a large 
degree of overlap (Alcock 2001). We agree with this latter statement to some extent, and we 
have previously discussed the fact that some research topics have been successfully viewed from 
multiple perspectives (Brown et al. 2011; Laland and Brown 2011). In addition, we acknowledge 
that several researchers have successfully combined more than one of the approaches within their 
own research and have bridged between the sub-fields (e.g., Kaplan and Gangestad 2005). 
However, we also believe that the distinctions between the sub-fields are real; for example, the 
sub-fields differ significantly in methodology, views on which evolutionary processes are 
relevant, and consequently on the most likely explanations for important aspects of human 
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behaviour. Evolutionary epistemologists, like Donald Campbell, have argued that science 
progresses by scientists considering the adequacy of different proposals against the best evidence 
we can bring to bear on the subject (Heyes and Hull 2001). If so, science will progress best when 
whatever differences exist are clearly delineated. Hence, in this paper we take for granted the 
many agreements between the three areas and focus on the differences. Indeed, many current 
practitioners, particularly younger scientists, do not conceive of themselves as members of 
separate fields and view the issues that once divided them on their way to solution. 
We first provide a brief introduction to human sociobiology, as exemplified by Wilson’s 
(1975) book, Sociobiology: the New Synthesis, given that many of the current debates within the 
field stem from discussions that surrounded the conception of this field. The next sections then 
provide short summaries of the three main sub-fields that characterise current research – Human 
Behavioural Ecology, Evolutionary Psychology and Cultural Evolution (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Laland and Brown 2011). The following section then examines some of the key 
debates between the sub-fields, including questions of whether human beings exhibit 
maladaptive behaviour in modern environments, and what the relationships are between human 
cognition and our evolving culture, focusing particularly on the debates between Evolutionary 
Psychology and Cultural Evolution. As an example of where the differences between the sub-
fields are relevant to the economics community, we discuss alternative perspectives on 
cooperative behaviour between non-kin. We conclude that the disagreements between the sub-
fields are indeed over substantive scientific issues that need to be settled by future research. 
 
2 Human sociobiology 
In 1975, Edward O. Wilson, a Harvard professor of entomology, published Sociobiology: the 
New Synthesis, in which he promoted recent advances that were being made within the field of 
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evolutionary biology. Naïve group-selectionist views were being rapidly overtaken by the 
‘gene’s-eye’ perspective, as exemplified by the work of William Hamilton, Robert Trivers and 
George Williams. This new perspective was revolutionising the application of evolutionary 
theory to non-human animals, and the ground-breaking research of Hamilton, Trivers and others 
has been hugely influential in the field of animal behaviour to this day (e.g., Danchin et al. 
2008). More controversially, Wilson (1975; 1978) applied these theoretical advances to human 
behaviour (Human Sociobiology), providing evolutionary explanations for topics such as 
aggression, religion and homosexuality. Despite gaining many followers, Wilson’s comments on 
human behaviour resulted in hostile attacks from some critics (e.g., Allen et al. 1975; Rose et al. 
1984), including accusations of genetic determinism, storytelling and ignoring the influence of 
culture on human behaviour. Partly as a result of this hostility, many researchers who were 
applying evolutionary principals to the study of human behaviour mostly sought to distance 
themselves from Wilson’s sociobiology during the 1970s and 1980s, and the term ‘Human 
Sociobiology’ has generally fallen out of favour. However, other researchers, such as Sarah 
Hrdy, have been keen to highlight that sociobiological theory contributed a considerable amount 
to our understanding of animal behaviour and provided fertile ground for more recent 
applications of evolutionary theory to human behavior (Segerstråle 2000). In addition, Wilson 
embraced the emerging field of cultural evolution (Lumsden and Wilson 1981), and Wilson has 
continued to call for greater integration between the biological and social sciences (e.g., Wilson 
1998). 
 
3 Human Behavioural Ecology 
During the 1970s, anthropologists had already begun to apply contemporary concepts from 
evolutionary biology, such as optimality modelling and evolutionary game theory, to 
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observational data gathered from a diverse range of human populations (Chagnon and Irons 
1979). One of the key concepts within this sub-field, now referred to as Human Behavioural 
Ecology, is the idea that human behaviour is extremely flexible, and adaptive behaviour can be 
produced in response to a broad range of environmental variables (Borgerhoff-Mulder and 
Schacht 2012). Typically, Human Behavioural Ecologists appeal to the ‘phenotypic gambit’ 
(Grafen 1984), which allows researchers to test the prediction that behavior is fitness-optimizing 
in the particular environment under study without recourse to understanding the mechanisms 
involved. Such mechanisms could include a combination of genetic adaptation, physiological 
plasticity or culturally transmitted information. These researchers thus do not generally concern 
themselves with the mechanistic processes that are the central focus of the other major sub-
fields. Early proponents of Human Behavioural Ecology, such as Richard Alexander, Napoleon 
Chagnon and William Irons, attempted to explain human behaviour based on the assumption that 
individuals behave in a manner that maximises their reproductive success, with particular 
emphasis on foraging and reproductive behaviour. A strength of this approach is that it typically 
tries to explain concrete human behavior in real-world environments. Most Human Behavioural 
Ecology research has focused on non-Westernised societies with small-scale subsistence patterns 
and a relative absence of modern contraceptive technology (Borgerhoff Mulder and Schacht 
2012). However, other researchers have pointed out that there are good evolutionary reasons to 
expect that Human Behavioural Ecology approaches can be effective when applied to data from 
Westernised societies (Laland and Brown 2006), and the field of Human Behavioural Ecology 
has broadened since its inception to incorporate research on a wider range of populations and 
research topics (Nettle et al. 2013; Brown 2013), including consideration of the processes of 
cultural evolution (Borgerhoff Mulder and Schacht 2012). 
 
4 Evolutionary Psychology 
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The term ‘evolutionary psychology’ has a long history, including appearing in William James’ 
(1890, p. 146) Principles of Psychology, and could be used to refer to any evolutionary 
perspective on the human mind. Given the remarkable size of the human brain and its unique 
products like language and cumulative culture, every student of human evolution is an 
evolutionary psychologist. However, the term Evolutionary Psychology is now commonly used 
to describe a highly influential school of the human evolutionary sciences that was founded by 
Donald Symons, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (e.g., Symons 1989; Tooby and DeVore 1987; 
Cosmides and Tooby 1987; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Since the 1980s, Cosmides, Tooby, 
David Buss and Steven Pinker, in particular, have promoted the idea that the human brain 
consists of specialised psychological mechanisms that have evolved in response to recurrent 
selection pressures acting on our human ancestors. Evolutionary Psychologists argue that the 
most important stage of history for understanding the evolution of the human mind is the 
Pleistocene epoch when our ancestors were living as hunter-gatherers on the African savannah 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1987). Evolutionary Psychologists aim to describe the evolved 
psychological mechanisms that underlie human cognition, with an emphasis on domain-specific 
information processing devices that provide human beings with a universal toolkit of mental 
adaptations. These researchers argue that selection will have favoured psychological mechanisms 
that are suited to efficiently solving problems within specific domains, and this perspective has 
been applied to a broad range of topics, including mate choice, aggression, social exchange and 
morality (Buss 2005). While critics argue that Evolutionary Psychology will benefit from 
incorporating advances from adjacent research fields (Bolhuis et al. 2011), Evolutionary 
Psychology is perhaps the most impactful of the contemporary approaches, in terms of numbers 
of practitioners and wider dissemination. For example, Steven Pinker’s (1994) book The 
Language Instinct is one of the most highly cited books in the entire field. 
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5 Cultural Evolution 
The idea that Darwin’s theory of natural selection can be applied to entities other than genes was 
endorsed by Darwin (1871) himself, when he applied the idea of natural selection to language 
evolution and proposed an important role for traditions in human evolution. The gene itself was 
not part of Darwin’s pre-Mendelian vocabulary, of course. The idea of universal Darwinism has 
since spread to many scientific disciplines (Plotkin 1994). Researchers within the field of 
Cultural Evolution have applied evolutionary theory to human cultural traits and have shown 
how mathematical models can be used to understand how the frequencies or distributions of 
different cultural variants change over time (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and 
Richerson 1985). More broadly, the field of gene-culture co-evolution investigates how genes 
and culture co-evolve (Laland et al. 2010; Richerson and Boyd 2010a). Culture is pragmatically 
defined as ‘information capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from 
members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission’ 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005). Numerous factors can influence the process of information 
transmission, such as biases in how individuals learn, biases in which model is chosen, and 
preferences for learning or remembering some cultural variants over others (Richerson and Boyd 
2005). Cultural Evolutionists thus assume that rather domain-general psychological mechanisms 
can bias the acquisition of particular behaviour patterns (Sterelny 2012); for example, ‘copy the 
majority’ (or plurality) is a learning rule that can potentially be applied across numerous cultural 
domains. These relatively domain-general forces are generally weak at the individual level, 
agreeing with Tooby and Cosmides (1992) in this regard, but they can act as very powerful 
evolutionary forces when acting on populations over the evolutionary time scale to cumulatively 
“design” complex technologies and social institutions that are far beyond the capabilities of any 
one innovator (Boyd et al. 2011a). While the field of Cultural Evolution could once be criticised 
for failing to stimulate new empirical research, a sustained and rapidly expanding empirical 
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program began in the late 1990s (e.g., McElreath et al. 2005; Mesoudi and O’Brien 2008; 
Henrich and Broesch 2011; Morgan et al. 2012), including large cross-cultural collaborative 
projects (e.g. Henrich et. al. 2005, 2010; Henrich and McElreath 2002). 
 
6 Some current debates between the sub-fields 
Having given a brief overview of the main sub-fields within the human evolutionary behavioural 
sciences, we now highlight some potential points of contention where, in our opinion, the sub-
fields exhibit either quantitative or qualitative differences in their underlying assumptions about 
human behaviour (for more extensive discussions, see Brown et al. 2011; Laland and Brown 
2011; Boyd et al. 2011a). 
 
6.1 Do human beings exhibit maladaptive behaviour in modern environments? 
While all three sub-fields agree that the evolutionary mechanisms they postulate tend to 
commonly produce adaptive behaviour, the sub-fields are rather more distinctive in the extent of 
maladaptive behaviour that they predict. Many Evolutionary Psychologists argue that, because 
the human brain is a highly complex, slowly evolving organ, human beings are likely to exhibit 
an ‘adaptive lag’, meaning that much of human behaviour is sub-optimal in modern 
environments (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Any culturally evoked changes in human behaviour 
since the end of the Pleistocene are therefore assumed to be largely irrelevant to our 
understanding of the evolved human mind. For Tooby and Cosmides (1992), culture is part of 
the environment that, along with many other environmental influences, may trigger alternative 
developmental pathways, much as identical jukeboxes might play different tunes in different 
environments if that is how they were programmed. Barrett (2012) uses a norm of reaction 
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model of how the development of the organism responds to environmental inputs. In this 
formulation, evolved mental modules include a function that maps environmental variation onto 
behaviour. If human mental adaptations can be characterised as norms of reaction that were 
calibrated for hunting and gathering lifeways in Pleistocene environments, then many 
maladaptive mismatches between cognitive adaptations and the environment should exist in the 
vastly different lifeways of complex societies in the Holocene.  
In contrast, human Behavioural Ecologists argue that their research has shown that real-
world data often provide a good fit to models that assume optimal behavioural responses to 
current environmental parameters (Borgerhoff  Mulder 1991). Human Behavioural Ecologists 
start with the assumption that behaviour will be adaptive, but are willing to accept that 
maladaptive responses may occur, either as a result of critical environmental triggers or stimuli 
being absent, or as a result of culturally transmitted information. Whether behaviour is adaptive 
or maladaptive, in terms of genetic fitness, is tested empirically, generally by using long-term 
datasets. For example, these researchers have considered conspicuous puzzling cases like the 
transition to low fertility in the course of modernization, where fertility appears to be sub-
optimal (Kaplan 1994; Borgerhoff Mulder 1998). The answer Kaplan (1994) gives to the puzzle 
of the demographic transition is that, in the unprecedentedly wealthy societies of many 
contemporary populations, we inadvertently over-invest in the quality of our offspring and have 
too few of them; this is the same sort of mismatch explanation as Evolutionary Psychologists 
might give. In contrast, other Human Behavioural Ecologists have pursued the possibility that 
sufficiently complex optimality models, involving trade-offs between quality and quantity of 
offspring, can shed light on patterns of family size in post-demographic transition societies (e.g., 
Lawson and Mace 2011; Lawson et al. 2012). Human Behavioural Ecologists generally do not 
envisage high levels of mal-adaptations in modern environments, because they hold a less 
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domain-specific view of the underlying mechanisms than do Evolutionary Psychologists 
(Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 1997). 
Evolutionary Psychologists, Human Behavioural Ecologists and Cultural Evolutionists do 
appear to agree that maladaptive behavioural responses can result from cultural processes. The 
social learning strategies that are studied by Cultural Evolutionists could lead to the acquisition 
of maladaptive information (i.e., information that fails to enhance genetic reproductive success) 
in some instances, as long as the learning strategies themselves are favoured by selection 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005). Take the issue of whether or not to learn from people other than 
your parents. On the one hand, doing so will expose a learner to much more cultural variation 
than is likely to be present in just two parents, and, to the extent that learning biases let learners 
chose adaptive traits, the more variation the better. On the other hand, some harmful cultural 
variants may arise that exploit general purpose decision-making systems to the detriment of the 
learner’s genetic fitness. For example, Newson and colleagues (2007) used a combination of 
models, experiments and survey data to argue that the main cause of the modern decline in 
fertility was a sharp increase in the ratio of non-kin to kin in social networks, leading to the 
spread of fertility-limiting cultural information between unrelated peers. Weak general-purpose 
biases, such as ‘copy the majority’, can sometimes be inadequate defence against specific 
maladaptive ideas, perhaps explaining the demographic transition and other oddities of 
modernity (Newson and Richerson 2009). The trade-off of increased power of biases against the 
risk of acquiring fitness-limiting ideas might well have been optimized by selection in past 
societies, and the risk of acquiring maladaptive information might have increased substantially in 
modern environments, for example because mass media exposes us to many attractively 
packaged cultural variants designed by advertisers to increase their sales, not the recipients 
fitness.  
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Given that the cognitive mechanisms underlying human culture are assumed to have been 
selected for their overall fitness-enhancing properties, the extent of the ‘adaptive lag’ is likely to 
be less extreme than envisaged by some Evolutionary Psychologists (Laland and Brown 2006). 
Cultural Evolutionists differ from Evolutionary Psychologists in highlighting the potential for 
cultural transmission to produce fitness-maximizing solutions to novel problems, including those 
produced by human culture itself. While Cultural Evolutionists certainly have no quarrel with the 
idea that the developing organism has many circuits that respond adaptively to evolutionarily 
relevant environmental inputs and maladaptively to novel ones, culture is, in their view, a 
completely different system. Culture is a system that fairly quickly evolves novel solutions to 
novel problems. In this respect, cultural evolution is like a faster version of genetic evolution 
(Perreault 2012), and, like genetic evolution, generates design and functionality in traits. The 
speed of cultural evolution allows it to explore a very large design space. For example, Arctic 
people developed light, swift, safe boats to hunt seals using driftwood and skins, while European 
mariners developed large stout wooden sailing ships to pioneer a global commerce in bulk 
goods. Knowledge of how to make and operate such complex devices must be transmitted with 
reasonable fidelity so that weak relatively general-purpose cognition can, generation by 
generation, invent and select improvements in the designs of artifacts and social systems (Tennie 
et al. 2009). Where cultural processes induce environmental changes, selection can favour 
culturally-transmitted solutions, or generate selection pressures acting on the human genome 
(Laland et al. 2010; Richerson and Boyd 2010a; Stearns et al. 2010; Courtiol et al. 2012). 
Thus, Cultural Evolutionists expect that many types of temporal and spatial mismatches 
between ancestral human adaptations and their current environments will be solved by cultural 
evolution fairly quickly; for example, the development of protective clothing and shelter 
technology systems has allowed human beings to survive in environments with extreme low 
temperatures. Cultural evolution seems to explain why humans have been, if anything, more 
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successful in the Holocene than in the Pleistocene. We have undergone a veritable adaptive 
radiation of locally adapted economies using domesticated plants and animals. At the same time, 
the disease and nutritional environments created by the cultural evolution of agricultural 
subsistence systems have put intense selective pressure on those aspects of human biology for 
which cultural fixes have proven elusive (Laland et al. 2010; Richerson and Boyd 2010a; Stearns 
et al. 2010); for example, an increasing proportion of starchy food in the diet following the 
adoption of agriculture has selected for increasing the number of copies of the enzyme amylase, 
which is secreted in saliva to begin the digestion of starch (Perry et al. 2007). More broadly, 
many organisms change conditions and factors in their local environments, a process known as 
niche construction, and thereby produce an organism-induced change in the selective 
environment (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Niche construction activities lead to feedback loops 
between organisms and their environments that alter the selection pressures on the organisms and 
their descendants, for example, leading to the fixation of alleles that would otherwise be 
deleterious and allowing the persistence of organisms in otherwise hostile environments (Odling-
Smee et al. 2003). The potency of human cumulative culture allows cultural niche construction 
to modify selection on human genes (Laland et al. 2001), and socially transmitted information 
thus has the ability to shape natural selection pressures, allowing genetic and cultural variation to 
co-evolve and novel evolutionary episodes to occur (Laland et al. 2000; Kendal et al. 2011). 
In summary, the three sub-fields have strong commonalities. All three take it for granted 
that humans possess evolved psychological mechanisms that produce adaptive responses to 
environmental cues, as long as the environment is not too dissimilar to ancestral environments. 
All three agree that mismatches can occur when modern environments are very dissimilar to 
those of our ancestors. All three agree that cultural transmission (or contagion) processes can 
sometimes lead to the adoption of behaviour patterns that are maladaptive at the level of gene 
transmission. However, Cultural Evolutionists and Human Behavioural Ecologists agree that 
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culture itself can quickly evolve solutions to novel problems, resulting in culturally constructed 
environments that fit with our previous adaptations, or that instead lead to new bouts of genetic 
evolution (Laland and Brown 2006), while, in contrast, some Evolutionary Psychologists 
maintain that cultural evolution has limited explanatory power (Pinker 2010). Thus, the type of 
adaptive lag envisaged by Cultural Evolutionists differs from that of the Evolutionary 
Psychologists. For Cultural Evolutionists, mis-matches are generally self-induced and can result 
in both cultural and genetic responses, with gene-culture co-evolutionary processes potentially 
minimising the mis-match between current environments and previous adaptations.  
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) provided a sweeping critique of the “Standard Social 
Science Model” and its heavy dependence on the concept of transmitted culture, and they 
proposed a radically cognitivist alternative. Cultural Evolutionists agree that a blank slate model 
of human cognition is untenable, but argue that cognitive constraints on transmitted culture are 
considerably weaker than Evolutionary Psychologists allow. If so, the SSSM is quite right to 
stress the importance of culture if wrong in its radical attempt to deny any importance to genetic 
evolution and the products of genetic evolution, such as important elements of cognition. 
Cultural Evolutionists take the massive adaptive radiation of humans in the Holocene based upon 
culturally transmitted technology and social institutions, and the lack of a massive mismatch of 
Pleistocene-adapted people to Holocene environments, to be some of the best evidence available 
for the gene-culture coevolution and cultural niche construction picture of human evolution. 
 
6.2 What is the evolved function of cognition and culture? 
Evolutionary Psychologists originally viewed the human mind as consisting of evolved 
psychological mechanisms that are content-specific computational processing devices adapted 
for Pleistocene hunting and gathering existence (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). (See the discussion 
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below on improvisational intelligence for a discussion of a different, more recent evolutionary 
psychological hypothesis about human cognition.) In contrast, Cultural Evolutionists focus on 
relatively general-purpose learning mechanisms that produce biases in behavioural outcomes 
depending upon the context of learning in addition to the content of the transmitted information 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005; Boyd et al. 2011a); for example, a prestige-bias (‘copy prestigious 
individuals’) can lead individuals to acquire information about diet, hunting techniques or mates 
(Henrich and Gil-White 2001). The human mind is likely to contain both domain-specific and 
domain-general psychological mechanisms, allowing for some apparent integration between 
these perspectives. Our sensitivity to pain in the human head and face is clearly a domain-
specific adaptation to protect the relatively fragile and important organs of the head from 
damage. Many such domain-specific adaptations likely exist. Therefore, the relative importance 
of more domain-specific versus more domain-general mechanisms in directing human cognition 
and behavior appears to be an empirical question that is amenable to resolution.  
However, the sub-fields have different hypotheses about the main adaptive function of 
human cognition. According to Cultural Evolutionists, the strongly cognitive picture of the 
Evolutionary Psychologists got the main adaptive problem of the Pleistocene wrong. Tooby and 
Cosmides (1992) have argued that humans evolved cognitive adaptations to the statistical 
regularities of Pleistocene environments. If so, Barrett’s (2012) reaction norm model of 
phenotypic flexibility would be adequate. However, according to Cultural Evolutionists, the 
ancestral world was insufficiently regular to favour numerous highly specific cognitive 
adaptations, and selection instead favoured a smaller number of more general rules. As it turns 
out the Pleistocene was a stunningly variable environment that was statistically quite 
unpredictable (National Research Council 2002). While early records of climatic variation only 
resolved low-frequency glacial cycles with time scales of tens of thousands of years, 
paleoclimatologists have recently discovered that glacial environments became increasingly 
16 
 
packed with high amplitude noisy variation on times scales of decades to millennia over the last 
eight glacial cycles (Loulergue et al. 2008). The Pleistocene is also the culmination of a 50-
million-year-long trend toward drier climates and polar cooling that increased spatial variation in 
the Earth’s habitats (Zachos et al. 2001). According to Boyd and Richerson (1985), social 
learning would be most useful in environments with lots of unpredictable variation that is 
concentrated in events with durations too long for adaptation by individual learning but too short 
for genetic adaptations to evolve, just the sorts of variation that typify the Pleistocene. Human 
cultural complexity and brain size increases appear to have roughly paralleled this increase in 
climatic variability (Richerson et al. 2005).  
Cultural Evolutionists thus argue that the evolved psychological mechanisms in the brain 
evolved in response to the challenges posed by variable environments and that culture is an 
important mechanism by which populations can express adaptive responses to environmental 
challenges. In contrast, Human Behavioural Ecology has remained relatively mechanism-neutral, 
relying on the ability of optimality and life history models to predict adaptive outcomes in the 
presence of hypothesized environmental triggers, regardless of the underlying proximate 
mechanisms (Smith 2000). From its inception, this field has included cultural information as one 
potential source of adaptive ‘fit’ with the environment. Cultural Evolutionists have no quarrel 
with the application of evolutionary models, such as life history and optimal foraging theory 
from evolutionary ecology to human populations (e.g. Boughton and O’Connell 1999; 
Borgerhoff Mulder 1991; Smith et al. 2001) but do think they have limitations. In particular the 
assumption that human populations are always at an adaptive equilibrium is misleading if 
cultures are actively evolving, a possibility that Human Behavioural Ecologists have historically 
ignored, or at least tried to ignore by choosing “traditional” populations, or at least traditional 
behavioural patterns, in apparent equilibrium. For example, Kennett (2005) interprets a pattern 
of resource use intensification in aboriginal Southern California in terms of optimal foraging 
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decisions interacting with climate and oceanographic change. But long term patterns of 
intensification occur almost everywhere in the Holocene and probably represent the relatively 
slow, progressive increase of technical and social sophistication made possible by the shift to 
warm, wet, relatively stable climates at the beginning of the Holocene.  
Examples such as this strongly suggest that use of the phenotypic gambit has led to a 
relative neglect of culture as a transformational force in human evolution (Borgerhoff Mulder 
and Schacht 2012; Brown 2013). Human Behavioural Ecologists do seek the source of changes 
in physical and social conditions that result in changing optima over time, for example, by asking 
why a population changes from matriliny to patriliny in the context of increasing heritable 
wealth. However, some Behavioural Ecologists have argued that culture should be treated like 
any other proximate mechanism (Nettle et al. 2013), which leads to the neglect of how cultural 
transmission can radically affect the dynamics of adaptive change (Brown 2013). Much of the 
research within Human Behavioural Ecology involves the application of ahistorical adaptive 
equilibrium models that do not take into account past trajectories of cultural evolution, and 
culture is treated as a proximal adaptive system responding to exogenous environmental change. 
This approach risks ignoring the fact that the very environment to which humans are adapting is 
itself partly an endogenous, dynamic product of cultural evolution, an issue that closely parallels 
evolutionary economists’ critique of neoclassical models (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
In summary, while Evolutionary Psychologists (e.g., Tooby and Cosmides 1992) and 
Cultural Evolutionists (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985) have generally differed in the emphasis 
that is placed on more domain-specific versus more domain-general mechanisms, the difference 
between these sub-fields extends beyond this apparently quantitative distinction. For Cultural 
Evolutionists, culturally transmitted information has played a vital role in the ability of ancestral 
human populations to adapt to, and regulate, unpredictably varying environments, and any 
explanations of human behaviour that fail to take cultural evolutionary processes into account 
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will provide only an incomplete understanding. As discussed in the next section, Evolutionary 
Psychologists have instead argued that incorporating culture into the equation should have 
relatively little impact on how we think about the evolved human mind, as cultural content is 
ultimately under genetic control. 
 
6.3 What are the proximal mechanisms of cultural acquisition? 
Evolutionary Psychologists and Cultural Evolutionists have quite different views of what 
happens in cultural transmission. Evolutionary Psychologists hold what is called an 
‘epidemiological’ theory of culture in which cultural variation is rather tightly limited by the 
cognitive psychology of representations (Sperber 1984). In the epidemiological model of culture, 
Evolutionary Psychologists focus on  the role that evolved cognitive processes play in 
controlling information transmission, and they stress the importance of representations being 
reconstructed in the minds of the learners. For example, Tooby and Cosmides (1992) state that: 
The design of human psychological architecture structures the nature of the social 
interactions humans can enter into, as well as the selectively contagious transmission of 
representations between individuals. Only after the description of the evolved 
psychological architecture has been restored as the centerpiece of social theory can the 
secondary anti-entropic effects of population-level social dynamics be fully assessed and 
confidently analyzed. (p. 48) 
And: 
Rather than calling this class of representations "transmitted" culture, we prefer terms 
such as reconstructed culture, adopted culture, or epidemiological culture. The use of the 
word "transmission" implies that the primary causal process is located in the individuals 
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from whom the representations are derived. In contrast, an evolutionary psychological 
perspective emphasizes the primacy of the psychological mechanisms in the learner that, 
given observations of the social world, inferentially reconstruct some of the 
representations existing in the minds of the observed. (p. 118) 
 
While these quotes suggest that information transmission is likely to have low fidelity, as 
a result of continual bouts of reconstruction within the minds of observers, recent work in 
developmental and comparative psychology shows that human culture does in fact transmit 
information quite accurately by cognitive systems apparently selected for that exact purpose 
rather than for restricting variation by strongly biasing what can be learned. For example, 
experiments by Tomasello, Whiten and colleagues (e.g. Tomasello 1996; Whiten et al. 2009), 
which compare the social learning skills of humans and great apes, have shown that young 
children are much more accurate imitators than are apes. Children quite faithfully replicate the 
arbitrary, non-functional patterns of behaviour that the experimentalists introduce into their 
experimental tasks. Apes largely ignore such actions and concentrate on using the demonstration 
for clues about how to get the reward the experimenters offer. As a result, children are prepared 
to learn skills that have no immediate reward, except perhaps the internal reward of “doing it 
right”. Later, these skills often turn out to be critical to building complex artifacts and for 
displaying complex, arbitrary signals of group membership, such as “correct” etiquette. 
Experiments designed to uncover the cognitive underpinnings of cultural transmission also 
strongly suggest that our cognition has evolved so that infants and children could acquire the 
quite complex and often counter-intuitive ideas and practices of their culture (Carey 2009; 
Buchsbaum et al. 2011; Csibra and Gergely 2011; Harris 2012; Sterelny 2012). Psychological 
mechanisms in the learner and in the people acting as teachers or models are both important. 
Given the accurate transmission of a wide range of cultural constructions, populations of humans 
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can turn the same rather weak, relatively general-purpose learning schemes that underpin 
reinforcement-based individual learning into powerful evolutionary forces that cumulatively 
generate complex cultural adaptations faster than can genetic evolution acting on random genetic 
variation.  
Interestingly, an important example that Pinker and Bloom (1990), Tooby and Cosmides 
(1992) and Pinker (1994) use to exemplify their highly cognitively structured model of 
epidemiological culture is Chomsky’s proposal that language learning is underpinned by a 
content-rich modular system. Cultural evolutionists have been major contributors to the field of 
evolutionary linguistics in the years since Pinker and Bloom’s pioneering contribution 
(Richerson and Boyd 2010b). Certainly, cultural evolutionists don’t deny that humans are 
cognitively prepared to learn and use language, but many linguists now believe that language 
may share most of its cognitive learning machinery with other aspects of culture (e.g. Tomasello 
2008; Christiansen and Chater 2008; Smith and Kirby 2008; Evans and Levinson 2009; Hurford 
2011). Chomsky’s original “principles and parameters” approach to the cognitive foundations of 
language did not successfully deal with the vast diversity of grammatical inventions comparative 
linguists discovered in the late 20
th
 Century (Newmeyer 2004). Chomsky himself has recognized 
the importance of evolution in explaining language but has become a minimalist regarding the 
cognitive structures involved (Hauser et al. 2002). Thus, what once was taken to be a convincing 
example of a content-rich cognitive system tightly constraining cultural variation is now 
plausibly an example of the dominance of cognitive adaptations for teaching and learning a more 
weakly constrained body of transmitted culture. 
Thus, while many evolutionary psychologists emphasize the cognitive processes that 
allow information to be reconstructed in the receiver’s mind and that structure the type of 
information that is likely to be received, cultural evolutionists argue for less restriction with 
regard to the type of information that is transmitted and point to the evidence that psychological 
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mechanisms favour relatively accurate information transmission, even when such information is 
arbitrary or maladaptive. Controversies within the field of language evolution highlight how 
researchers are attempting to delineate the specific evolved psychological mechanisms that 
underlie human social learning and that give rise to so much cultural diversity. 
 
6.4 Is cultural evolution or improvisational intelligence the better explanation for the 
diversity and complexity of human behaviour? 
Evolutionary Psychologists have certainly not been blind to the extremely diverse and highly 
creative cultural adaptations that are a human specialty. In recent papers, Evolutionary 
Psychologists have hypothesized that humans, uniquely among all animals, have what they call 
improvisation intelligence (Cosmides and Tooby 2001): individuals can use individual cognition 
to invent complex and adaptive cultural traits as needed. As Pinker (2010) puts it: 
These cognitive stratagems are devised on the fly in endless combination suitable to the 
local ecology. They arise by mental design and are deployed, tested, and fine-tuned by 
feedback in the lifetimes of individuals, rather than arising by random mutation and being 
tuned over generations by the slow feedback of differential survival and reproduction (p. 
8449). 
 
This proposal seems at variance with the argument in Tooby and Cosmides (1992) that general 
purpose intelligences are inevitably weak, the cornerstone of their hypothesis that cognitive 
mechanisms must be modular. On their original argument, the improvisational intelligence idea 
therefore must be wrong. Cosmides and Tooby (2001) admit that the evolution of 
improvisational intelligence is enigmatic but believe that an increase in the number of modular 
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structures, together with some means of dealing with the combinatorial explosion involved in 
keeping in mind many dimensions of a complex problem, have somehow been solved in humans.  
Cultural Evolutionists argue that the improvisational intelligence hypothesis greatly 
overstates individual creativity relative to the power of weak, relatively general-purpose learning 
systems acting in concert with accurate cultural transmission in leading to the cumulative 
evolution of cultural complexity (Boyd et al. 2011a). Much evidence suggests that complex 
human “inventions” have in fact been reached by a long history of cumulative improvement by 
relatively small steps, a generalization well documented by the pioneering archaeologist and 
ethnographer Pitt Rivers in the late 19
th
 Century (Bowden 1991) and widely supported by 
numerous modern studies (see Basalla 1988; Henrich 2009 and Mesoudi 2011 for overviews). 
Recent successful applications of phylogenetic methods drawn from biology necessarily assume 
a pattern of “descent with modification” on the part of some aspects of culture as well as genes 
(e.g. Gray et al. 2011; Mace and Jordan 2011). The role of blind variation and small incremental 
improvements in the evolution of even comparatively simple artifacts such as paper clips and 
dinner forks has been documented by Petroski (1992). Thus Cultural Evolutionists are skeptical 
that improvisational intelligence is a sound alternative to cumulative cultural evolution to explain 
the complexity and diversity of human cultural adaptations. Certainly humans improvise new 
solutions to problems, but such improvisation is heavily reliant on minor refinements of 
culturally transmitted knowledge and hence more closely fits the Cultural Evolutionists’ 
Darwinian model than the Evolutionary Psychologists’ macromutational improvisational 
intelligence conception. 
 
7 A case study: non-kin cooperation in humans 
The sub-fields also differ sharply over how to explain the large amount of non-kin cooperation in 
our species. Everyone agrees that the large-scale societies of the Holocene include a lot of 
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cooperation between distantly related and unrelated people. There is also widespread agreement 
among the sub-fields that the proximal mechanisms for ensuring cooperation include such things 
as reputation, sanctioning of those who misbehave, and the use of language to negotiate actions, 
make promises, and spread reputational information through gossip (Smith 2010). Evolutionary 
Psychologists (e.g. Pinker 2010) have explained human cooperation among non-relatives on the 
basis of selection for reciprocal exchange plus language being sufficient to create the proximal 
mechanisms listed above. In contrast, Cultural Evolutionists propose that a special form of group 
selection, cultural group selection, played an important role in the evolution of prosocial 
cognitive adaptations and that ongoing cultural group selection plays a role in the evolution of 
social institutions (e.g. Richerson and Henrich 2012; Turchin 2009; see also Bowles and Gintis 
2011, for a case for culture-facilitated genetic group selection). The basic idea is a modernization 
of Darwin’s tribal scale selection hypothesis in the Descent of Man: 
It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a 
slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over other men of 
the same tribe, yet that an advancement in the standard of morality and an 
increase in the number of well-endowed men will certainly give an immense 
advantage to one tribe over another. There can be no doubt that a tribe including 
many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, 
fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid each other 
and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most 
other tribes; and this would be natural selection (Darwin 1871: p. 166). 
 
Modern evolutionists have learned that it is hard to make group selection on genetic 
variation work on large outbred populations such as human tribes. However, the same is not 
necessarily true if the variation on which selection operates is cultural. Neighbouring societies 
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are seldom very different genetically but they are often quite different culturally (Bell et al. 
2009). A number of properties of cultural evolution make it easier to generate and preserve 
cultural variation at the level of tribes and other large groups (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 203-6). 
For example, social institutions usually include a system of rewards that favour those who 
conform to the institution and punishments for those who don’t, damping down individual-level 
variation within groups (Bowles and Gintis 2011). Immigrants, particularly child immigrants, 
tend to adopt the culture of their hosts and lose the culture of their ancestors even as they 
interbreed and pass their genes into their host group. Prosocial emotions would have acted as 
biases favouring institutions that better satisfied these emotions, and many of the most powerful 
societies throughout history, including China, Rome, and the modern West have grown by 
selective immigration (Boyd and Richerson 2009). The “design space” for social institutions is 
very large, in part because a system of rewards and punishments can stabilize almost any pattern 
of behaviour (e.g. Aoki 2001). Human competition is very often between organizations: a 
simplified example would be that, in most modern economies, anti-competitive behaviour 
between firms is outlawed so that consumers can enjoy the benefits of business firms having to 
compete to produce better and less expensive products.  
To explain the vast diversity of human social arrangements, Cultural Evolutionists thus 
appeal to the importance of culturally transmitted norms and institutions, whereas Evolutionary 
Psychologists consider that many forms of interaction between genes and the environment that 
occur during the lifetime of an individual may be as important, or more important, than culture in 
explaining differences in behaviour (e.g, Pinker 2010). Cultural Evolutionists certainly agree that 
gene-environment interactions during the lifespan are highly important, but their concept of the 
environment involves complex feedback loops between developing organisms and their socially 
inherited environments. Evolutionary Psychologists have been among the stoutest critics of 
group selection in any form, as well as doubting the cultural evolution and gene-culture 
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coevolution do any useful work (Footnote 1). Pinker (2010) includes these concepts in a laundry 
list of what he considers to be dubious evolutionary ideas: 
[I]t seems superfluous, when explaining the evolution of human mental mechanisms, to 
assign a primary role to macromutations, exaptation, runaway sexual selection, group 
selection, memetics, complexity theory, cultural evolution (other than what we call 
“history”), or gene–culture coevolution (other than the commonplace that the products of 
an organism’s behavior are part of its selective environment). (p. 8996) 
 
Evolutionary Psychologists have explained non-kin cooperation by appealing to a history of 
reciprocal exchange in the Pleistocene that favoured the evolution of specialized cognitive 
structures designed, in Cosmides and Tooby’s (1992) famous example, for detecting cheaters in 
reciprocal exchanges. Experiments suggest that human subjects are much better at detecting 
violations of social contract rules compared to logical similar puzzles involving violations of 
other kinds of rules, such as neutral, empirically contingent rules (Cosmides 1989). To explain 
the fact that we cooperate in anonymous exchanges in modern societies, Evolutionary 
Psychologists argue that the cheater detection modules evolved in an environment where 
anonymous exchange was rare and are mis-calibrated for modern environments. As Cosmides 
and Tooby (1997) put it in general terms: 
. . . [O]ur modern skulls house a stone age mind. The key to understanding how the 
modern mind works is to realize that its circuits were not designed to solve the day-to-
day problems of a modern American -- they were designed to solve the day-to-day 
problems of our hunter-gatherer ancestors. These stone age priorities produced a brain far 
better at solving some problems than others.  For example, it is easier for us to deal with 
small, hunter-gatherer-band sized groups of people than with crowds of thousands; it is 
easier for us to learn to fear snakes than electric sockets, even though electric sockets 
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pose a larger threat than snakes do in most American communities. In many cases, our 
brains are better at solving the kinds of problems our ancestors faced on the African 
savannahs than they are at solving the more familiar tasks we face in a college classroom 
or a modern city. In saying that our modern skulls house a stone age mind, we do not 
mean to imply that our minds are unsophisticated. Quite the contrary: they are very 
sophisticated computers, whose circuits are elegantly designed to solve the kinds of 
problems our ancestors routinely faced. 
Specifically, in their functional analysis of social life, Cosmides and Tooby (1997) appear to rest 
their case solely on pairwise reciprocal exchange (also see Krasnow et al. 2012): 
Sometimes known as "reciprocal altruism", social exchange is an "I'll scratch your back if 
you scratch mine" principle. Economists and evolutionary biologists had already explored 
constraints on the emergence or evolution of social exchange using game theory, 
modeling it as a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. One important conclusion was that social 
exchange cannot evolve in a species or be stably sustained in a social group unless the 
cognitive machinery of the participants allows a potential cooperator to detect individuals 
who cheat, so that they can be excluded from future interactions in which they would 
exploit co-operators. 
Thus, even in experiments where researchers guarantee anonymity, human cognition, these 
authors argue, calculates as if we still live in small-scale societies where familiar others are 
observing and noting your behaviour and that these observers are likely to be future reciprocity 
partners. 
In contrast, Cultural Evolutionists argue that a considerable amount of evidence supports 
the hypothesis that a history of cultural group selection can explain the evolution of non-kin 
cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Chudek and Henrich 2011). 
27 
 
Most fundamentally, humans everywhere live in large groups that vary culturally and compete 
with one another; by definition, the winners of these competitions spread their social institutions 
and other aspects of their culture to daughter societies, attract immigrants from other societies 
and are imitated by other societies. For instance, many modern nations in Europe and Latin 
America follow legal codes descended from Roman law, speak languages descended from Latin, 
and follow religions derived from Roman Christianity. Social identity theorists have documented 
the mechanisms by which groups become part of our social identity (Haslam 2001), and 
developmental evidence suggests that young children readily learn social norms from caregivers 
and others (Chudek and Henrich 2011). Theoretical models have also shown that circumstances 
favouring social learning generally lead to conformity of behaviour, with individuals tending to 
copy what the majority of the population are doing (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985; Nakahashi 
et al. 2012; Perreault et al. 2012). Such conformity will tend to minimise behavioural differences 
within groups, providing the opportunity for cultural group selection to occur.  
Further, humans are not just adept at reciprocal exchange but are also generally adept at 
solving problems that require high levels of cooperation, such as occur in managing commons 
and the provision of defense. Ethnographic analogy and palaeoanthropology suggest that 
ancestral societies by the late Pleistocene were quite large and that non-kin interactions would 
not have been uncommon (Powell et al. 2009; Hill et al. 2011).  Chudek et al. (in press) review 
evidence that suggests that ephemeral interactions with strangers are common in the hunter-
gather ethnographic record. The existence of long distant trade networks in decorative shell and 
valuable tool-stone in the Holocene (Baugh and Erickson 1994) and Upper Paleolithic (Klein 
2009) suggests that by the latest Pleistocene at least humans were adept at establishing 
relationships with strangers. For example, acephalous tribes using the same institutions as mobile 
food foragers, but based on more productive subsistence strategies like herding and farming, can 
operate on quite large scales. Compared to Evolutionary Psychology, Cultural Evolution stands 
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out in invoking a novel evolutionary mechanism (cultural group selection) to explain the 
extraordinary patterns of large scale cooperation in our species. 
A series of experiments conducted by Fehr and Gächter (2002) showed that cooperation 
in a public goods game could be sustained by altruistic punishment if that strategy was available. 
Based on this and other experiments devised by experimental economists, Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2003) suggest that cultural group selection and gene-culture coevolution might be required to 
explain human patterns of cooperation. However, laboratory experiments have failed to resolve 
the issue of whether humans exhibit features consistent with cultural group selection and gene-
culture coevolution for prosocial dispositions. Evolutionary Psychologists Hagen and 
Hammerstein (2006) and Delton et al. (2011) have pointed out that, even in experiments where 
researchers guarantee anonymity and tell participants that the games are one-shot, human 
cognition might still calculate as if we still live in small-scale societies where reciprocity 
partners are observing and sanctioning or rewarding their behaviour. However, this criticism 
applies to any such experiments, including the classical experiments of Cosmides (1989), which 
can only tap proximal mechanisms directly and may speak rather softly about the selection 
pressures that led to the mechanisms. For example, a facility for detecting violators of reciprocal 
agreements would also be useful for detecting violations of social contracts embedded in 
culturally transmitted social institutions. In any case, Chudek and Henrich (2011) point out that 
Cosmides’ classic experiment is framed in terms of norm violations, something they argue is not 
predicted by reciprocity theory.  
Mathew et al. (in press) review evidence suggesting that human cooperation with kin and 
unrelated partners is both heavily institutionalized and much more extensive than in most other 
animals. They suggest that institutions like marriage that are plausibly subject to cultural group 
selection are necessary to produce high levels of kin and partner cooperation; the conventional 
evolutionary mechanisms of inclusive fitness and reciprocity are perhaps not sufficient to explain 
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the extensive small-scale cooperation humans exhibit. A hypersensitivity to the possibility of 
adverse effects on one’s reputation or exaggerated fear of direct sanction is a plausible proximal 
cognitive trait that cultural group selection might have favoured by gene-culture coevolution to 
maintain high rates of intragroup cooperation. An increased understanding of the proximal 
mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour does not directly test hypotheses regarding the 
evolutionary history of those traits. 
A broad empirical and theoretical program is necessary to adjudicate conflicts between 
different evolutionary explanations of human cooperation and other important problems. 
Evidence for and against alternate evolutionary explanations must be sought across a series of 
consilient domains. Mathematical models are useful to check the logical coherence of 
explanations. Typically, all too many models are logically coherent and the real issue is which 
one best fits the data (e.g. Boyd et al. 2011b). Alternate formal models can also be fit directly to 
data using modern maximum likelihood based methods (Efferson and Richerson 2007; 
Borgerhoff Mulder and Beheim 2011). Data from microevolutionary studies demonstrating that 
cultural group selection and gene-culture coevolution operates in concrete cases is important 
(e.g. Mathew and Boyd 2011), and such studies must link microevolutionary evidence to 
macroevolutionary patterns. For example, some cases of culture led gene-culture coevolution due 
to the Holocene switch to agricultural subsistence are reasonably convincing (Laland et al. 2010, 
Richerson et al. 2010a). Paleoenvironmental and paleoanthropological data are necessary to 
understand what selective pressures acted on past human populations, and analyses of patterns of 
adaptive and maladaptive behaviour are often quite informative. In the case of explanations of 
human cooperation, as in other areas we have reviewed here, hot debates on this issue seem 
likely to persist for some time. 
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8 Conclusion 
In general, researchers within the sub-fields of Human Behavioural Ecology, Evolutionary 
Psychology and Cultural Evolution agree that evolutionary theory can be usefully applied to the 
study of human behaviour. In addition, there are numerous signs that integration of the sub-fields 
is being achieved. For example, Human Behavioural Ecologists are incorporating cultural 
transmission into their models of behavioural diversity (e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009; Hill 
et al. 2009; Currie et al. 2010), and Evolutionary Psychologists increasingly make use of cultural 
evolution and vice versa (e.g. Atran and Ginges 2012; Norenzayan and Gervais 2012; Chudek et 
al. 2012). However, we believe that some of the issues that divided the three approaches in the 
past do remain open and that both theoretical and empirical investigations are required to resolve 
them. For example, there is as yet no consensus on the exact roles of genes, individual learning, 
and social learning in human development (e.g. Spencer et al. 2009). Within evolutionary 
biology itself, similarly broad issues are currently being discussed and debated, such as 
usefulness of the distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations (Laland et al. 2011; 
2012) and the role of multi-level, group selection (Eldaker and Wilson 2011; Wilson et al. 2008), 
and such debates are highly relevant to researchers that are applying evolutionary principles to 
economics. For the novice researcher, these debates might appear daunting, but we hope that 
continued cross-disciplinary discussion and exchange of ideas will provide an ever richer 
understanding of human behaviour. 
 
Footnotes 
1) See a debate initiated by Steven Pinker’s essay The False Allure of Group Selection in 
the online magazine Edge (http://www.edge.org/conversation/the-false-allure-of-group-
selection). 
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